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Abstract: 
 
The ‘social investment market’ in the United Kingdom is a growth area due to the governments’ 
focus upon building up the supply-side element of the market over the last decade, often through the 
direct financing of ‘social and investment finance intermediaries’ (SIFIs). However, this ignores 
problems that can occur on the demand-side of the social investment market, such as a lack of 
‘investment readiness’ amongst social enterprises seeking investment. Indeed, whilst there is now a 
significant body of policy-based and practitioner research exploring the social investment market, 
there remains a paucity of empirical academic research. The research reported in this paper sought 
to explore SIFI perceptions of what constituted investment readiness in the social investment 
market. Semi-structured interviews were held with the fund managers (or relevant personnel) at 15 
SIFIs in order to explore what they believed constituted investment readiness and how they assessed 
this. The results indicate that the conception of investment readiness in the social investment market 
is similar to that held in mainstream financial markets. The results are discussed in relation to the 
prior literature and theories of the social investment market. 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Social Investment’, sometimes also called ‘Impact Investment’, ultimately seeks to provide finance 
to social ventures (either debt or equity finance) with an expectation that a social as well as 
financial return will be generated (Brown and Norman, 2011). In the United Kingdom (UK) the 
‘social investment market’ was estimated to have made a total of £165 million of social investments 
in 2011 (Brown and Norman, 2011) and this is predicted to grow to around £1 billion in the UK by 
2015 (Brown and Swersky, 2012). Indeed, the UK is positively placed to play a leading role in this 
global growth, due to its depth of social-purpose organisations, its strong financial sector (Evenett 
and Richter, 2011) and the strong political support for the social investment market that has come 
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from successive UK governments (Nicholls, 2010b). Accessing external funding or support through 
investment contracts or alliances can be beneficial to social enterprises as it builds organisational 
independence and resilience (Sakarya et al., 2012). However, these changes to the social 
enterprise’s core model of mission delivery provide challenges to management teams (Bugg-Levine 
and Emerson, 2011) that often require restructuring or skill-set injections at board level. An 
inability to successfully undertake these changes often causes problems for social enterprises 
seeking finance from the social investment market, as they do not have robust governance 
structures, skilled management teams and detailed business plans in place (Hines, 2005; Hill, 2011; 
Howard, 2012). This inability to access finance has led to social enterprises being encouraged to 
adopt private sector business practices in order to access social investment from ‘Social and 
Investment Finance Intermediaries’ (SIFIs) (Nicholls and Paton, 2009). This perception that social 
enterprises are not ‘investment ready’ has been driven by a duality in the social investment market, 
in which social enterprises cannot access social investment and social investors cannot find 
‘investment ready’ propositions (Howard, 2012).  
 
There is a current paucity of academic research into social finance and the social investment market 
in general and researchers have identified a need for more theoretical and empirical studies so that a 
more detailed understanding of the social investment market can be developed (Battle-Anderson 
and Dees, 2006; Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls and Paton, 2009; Nicholls, 2010a; Moore et al., 2012). 
Specifically and in relation to this study, there is no academic research that explores in detail what 
SIFIs define as ‘investment readiness’ and the research that does exist around the investment 
criteria of social investors is methodologically constrained and focuses too broadly on social 
investors. Indeed, a clearer understanding of the investment criteria adopted by SIFIs would allow 
social enterprises (and social enterprise support organisations) to more easily access capital in the 
social investment market. This paper reports research that explored SIFI perceptions of investment 
readiness through in-depth semi-structured interviews and uses this data to contribute to the 
theoretical and empirical conceptions of the social investment market.  
 
Analytical Framework 
 
Social Finance & the Structure of the Social Investment Market 
 
Social finance and the description of the social investment market adhered to in this article is 
distinct from ‘Socially Responsible Investment’ and ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’. Unlike 
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socially responsible investment, social finance requires more than the negative/positive screening 
practices adopted in commercial investments that focus on social, environmental and governance 
criteria relative to the investee. In relation to corporate social responsibility, social investment 
organisations have social impact at the core of their mission, as opposed to as an appendage to it 
(Geobey et al., 2012; Evenett and Richter, 2011). Social finance can be defined as being any ‘flows 
of capital that start-up, sustain, or grow individual, group, organisational or sectorial action aimed 
primarily at generating social or environmental value, often in the form of public goods or positive 
externalities’ (Nicholls and Paton, 2009: 3). Social finance includes a broad range of investment 
approaches including ‘impact investing’, government finance (i.e. Social Impact Bonds) and 
philanthropic investment through foundations (i.e. venture philanthropy) (Moore, Wesley and 
Brodhead, 2012). The organic development of the social investment market and the organisations 
operating in this market has led to a diverse and heterogeneous range of views on the future macro-
development of the market and of the financial tools and models that are operated at a micro-level 
(Howard, 2012). 
 
Nicholls (2010a) identifies three elements that constitute the structure of the market; supply, 
demand and intermediation. In the UK the supply-side investors have predominantly been 
charitable endowment funds, social banks and the UK government itself (Nicholls, 2010a). These 
supply-side investors seek what Emerson (2003) terms ‘blended returns on investment’, that is the 
delivery of both financial returns and social/environmental impacts from their investments. Nicholls 
and Murdock (2011) identified ‘demand-side’ organisations as being social enterprises, charities, 
cooperatives, social businesses and public/private hybrid organisations. These organisations all 
operate according to a ‘double or triple bottom-line’, in which a social/environmental mission has to 
be balanced alongside financial sustainability (Campi et al., 2006). These demand-side 
organisations seek investment capital either to start-up, grow or sustain their social activity. The 
social finance market is typical of many nascent markets in that it is made up of a small number of 
organisations that deliver a heterogeneous range of support, finance options and investment vehicles 
(Nicholls, 2010a). These organisations operate primarily in the intermediary market, in which SIFIs 
link social entrepreneurs with investors seeking a social impact (Evenett and Richter, 2011). The 
focus of the research reported in this paper was upon this intermediation element of the social 
investment market. 
 
A SIFI can be defined as any organisation with or without funds that seeks to match social investors 
with investees and these include social venture capital, social banks, brokers, advisors and some 
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charitable foundations (ClearlySo, 2011). Brown and Norman (2011) identified 30 SIFI 
organisations operating in the UK at a local, regional or national level, of which six SIFIs accounted 
for 90% of investment. SIFIs provide a mixture of debt (loans), quasi-equity (equity blended with 
debt-based repayments) and equity finance. Generally, SIFIs target higher financial returns for 
riskier investments (i.e. equity) and lower returns for less risky investments (i.e. secured loans). 
However, in addition to SIFIs offering such funding there are also venture philanthropy funds and 
social enterprise development organisations/brokerages. Venture philanthropy replaces the hands-
off approach utilised by individuals/foundations giving charitable donations, to a more deeply 
engaged approach in which the grant provided is secured on a contractual basis that is tied to 
preferred outcomes set by the philanthropic institution/individual (John, 2006). Social enterprise 
development organisations also provide consultancy support to social enterprises (as well as supply-
side investors) in the areas of law, accounting, marketing and business development (Nicholls, 
2010a).  
 
The Barriers to the Future Development of the UK Social Investment Market 
 
Nicholls (2010a) identifies three possible future scenarios for the social investment market. The first 
posits that the social investment market will move into the mainstream financial markets and be 
absorbed by them as the needs of the investor are given priority. The second states that the status 
quo will persist and that the social investment market will remain on the margins of the mainstream 
investment sector, with investor needs and the ‘logic of gift giving’ achieving a tensional balance 
(Nicholls, 2010a). The third theorises that the social investment market will act as a transformative 
agent and that the idea of ‘blended-value’ would be exported over time to the mainstream finance 
sector, which would in-turn drive systemic change that would see social and environmental return 
calculations built into all investments due to the primacy of a values-driven rationality. Nicholls 
(2010a: 90) states that at the present time it appears as if it is the first scenario that ‘is moving 
towards dominance’, which can be evidenced through the large numbers of actors from the 
mainstream finance sector that are playing a leading role in shaping the development of the social 
investment market. 
 
There are a number of factors within the UK social investment market that are acting as barriers to 
growth. These include a lack of risk-assessment and social impact metrics, which leads to a 
‘fragmentary landscape’ in which information flow is limited and inappropriate financial 
instruments are imported from the mainstream market (Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls, 2010b; Wood et 
5 
 
al., 2012). This lack of information leads to extended due-diligence processes, put in place by risk-
averse organisations that increase transaction costs (Evenett and Richter, 2011), and these costs are 
exacerbated by the high number of investor sources that SIFIs have to utilise compared with an 
equivalent, mainstream fund (O’Donohoe et al., 2010). These high transaction costs leave less 
recyclable capital and also may mean that riskier propositions are priced out of the investment 
market (Geobey et al., 2012). The difficulties inherent in trying to measure social impact have also 
led to a lack of information in the social investment market, a factor that is complicated by the 
existence of a plethora of methodologies for measuring social impact. Three prominent social 
impact methodologies have arisen in the social investment market; namely ‘Social Return on 
Investment’ (SROI) (Maree and Mertens, 2012); the ‘Impact Reporting and Investment Standards’ 
(IRIS); and its derivative the ‘Global Impact Investing Rating System’ (GIIRS) (Saltuk et al., 
2011). However, the use of SROI has been limited as the monetisation of complex social problems 
is seen as limited in its effectiveness (Maree and Mertens, 2012); whilst research by Saltuk et al. 
(2011) highlighted that only 20.15% of social investors utilised IRIS or GIIRS.  
 
Another barrier to growth for the social investment market has been the perceived lack of demand-
side organisations that are investment ready and the perception of social enterprises as high-risk 
investments (Strandberg, 2007). This was further emphasised in more recent research by Howard 
(2012) that identified a demand/supply gap in the social investment market between supply-side 
investors and demand-side investees. A lack of investment readiness amongst demand-side 
investees is a factor that will limit the growth of the social investment market and that will 
potentially stifle riskier (but more innovative) early-stage financing. Research that therefore 
understands what SIFIs define as investment readiness will provide social enterprises and their 
support organisations with important information that they can use to develop their organisations in 
order to access finance from the social investment market.  
 
Research into investment criteria in the social investment market has been carried out, with 
McWade (2012) identifying five areas of social investor (supply-side) focus. These were (1) the 
social mission and its centrality to the overall business aims; (2) a solid and concise business plan; 
(3) a skilled and credible management team/board; (4) the company’s financial viability and (5) a 
clearly defined exit plan. Indeed, McWade (2012) identified that whilst the social mission is 
important to social investors, this criterion supplements rather than replaces the financial due-
diligence that occurs in the mainstream investment market. However, McWade’s (2012) analysis 
was carried out amongst social investors as a whole (high net-worth individuals, institutional 
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investors and consumer depositors) and did not specifically focus upon SIFIs or the intermediary 
element of the market. This is an important distinction as not only is the social investment market in 
the UK heavily reliant on these intermediaries (Evenett and Richter, 2011), but the pool of social 
investors that invest in the social investment market is extremely heterogeneous. In addition, the 
participant recruitment and data analysis methodologies utilised by McWade (2012) are unspecified 
and so the validity of the results are difficult to determine. There therefore remains a need for the 
evaluation of investment readiness within the intermediary element of the social investment market 
that is rigorous and valid in both its recruitment of participants and the analysis of the interview 
data. However, the lack of academic research on the social investment market first requires an 
examination of the mainstream finance literature around investment readiness in order to develop a 
clear conceptual understanding. 
 
Investment Readiness 
 
Government interventions aimed at increasing ‘small and medium-sized enterprise’s’ (SMEs) 
access to finance are usually targeted at increasing the availability of supply-side capital (Mason 
and Kwok, 2010). In the UK there has been a focus upon developing the supply-side of the social 
investment market, as the government has sought to create a market and regulatory framework for 
social finance through legislation and direct/indirect funding (Nicholls, 2010b). This has resulted in 
the neglect of problems on the demand-side of the social investment market (such as a lack of 
investment readiness amongst social enterprises), although this focus is now shifting through such 
schemes as the ‘Investment and Contract Readiness Fund’ (SIB, 2013). Gregory et al. (2012: 6) 
define investment readiness as “…an investee being perceived to possess the attributes, which 
makes them an investible proposition by an appropriate investor for the finance they are seeking.” 
The process of seeking investment and becoming investment ready begins at the point that the 
entrepreneur/enterprise realise that their personal resources, or those of their organisation, are 
insufficient for their start-up, growth or sustainability needs (Silver et al., 2010).  
 
Prior research identifies the quality of a potential investee’s business plan as being crucial to the 
investment readiness of an SME (Howard, 2012), with investors often being frustrated by the poor 
quality of the business proposals submitted for funding (Mason and Harrison, 1999; Paul et al., 
2003). The viability of a business proposal involves an examination of the capitalisation of the 
business, the management team in place, return versus risk analysis and the quality of information 
held and provided by the business (Mason and Harrison, 2001; Mason and Kwok, 2010). In a study 
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of debt and equity investors, Mason and Stark (2004) identified that debt financiers (bankers) 
placed more emphasis on financial data than did equity financiers (venture capitalists and business 
angels). This is possibly due to the lower margins on debt-finance investments, which force bankers 
to minimise ‘Type One Errors’ (lending to businesses that subsequently fail), as well as a debt-
financiers’ reduced ability to monitor an investment in the same detail that an equity investor could 
(Mason and Stark, 2004). Research has also shown that there are also high rejection rates of 
business proposals by equity investors, usually directly related to poor business proposals that do 
not meet investment criteria (Mason and Kwok, 2010). Despite this, there are also numerous 
rejections of good business propositions that are otherwise investment ready. This is because in 
markets where imperfect information exists, investors need to balance risk and this leads to 
‘investment ready’ businesses being declined capital (Deakins et al., 2008). 
 
The characteristics and skill-sets of the entrepreneur and their management teams have also been 
shown in prior research to be extremely important in accessing finance and being considered 
investment ready. Indeed, the suitability of the entrepreneur, which relates to a critique of their 
business skills, expertise, projections and personal qualities such as integrity (Mason and Harrison, 
2001; Kollmann and Kuckertz, 2010; Mason and Kwok, 2010) has been shown to be extremely 
important in investor decision-making processes. Muzyka et al. (1996) suggests that investors, as 
well as assessing the entrepreneur(s), are also concerned with the management team of a potential 
investee organisation, which is often more important than analyses of the market, product and deal 
structure. However, Vasilescu (2009) also argues that it is just not the quality of a management 
team, but also the way that it is structured that is important to investors. A management team could 
be of a high quality and possess a good skill-set, but if that is not complemented by a coherent and 
appropriate structure then investors may be deterred. This has particular relevance for social 
enterprises seeking to access the social investment market as research has shown that concerns over 
entrepreneurial/management skill-sets, as well as governance structures, are two of the main reasons 
for investors declining social enterprise investment opportunities (Hill, 2011). 
 
The impact that the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur(s) has upon the chances of 
successfully acquiring investment has also been shown to be important in prior research. Bank loan 
officers were shown to make subjective evaluations around a potential investee’s character, with 
favourable characteristics viewed as conformity, low risk-taking propensity and professionalism 
(Wilson et al., 2007). This has also been evidenced as taking place in the equity investment sector, 
with the evaluation of ‘soft data’ and the use of intuition forming an integral part of the venture 
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capitalist investor’s due-diligence process (Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Often intuitive 
decision-making processes are a symbol of a lack of clear information in a market, as investors have 
to rely on their ‘gut reaction’ (Jankowicz and Hisrich, 1987), particularly when funding start-up or 
early-phase businesses (Ramón et al., 2007; Ferrary, 2010). Indeed, this last point relating to ‘gut 
reaction assessments’ has also been shown by prior research to take place in venture capital 
assessments of social entrepreneurs (Achleitner et al., 2012). Mason and Harrison (2001) also 
discuss the negative effect that poor presentational skills can have on a business and how this is 
particularly crucial in verbal, face-to-face pitches to investors. This importance of the personal 
characteristics of the entrepreneur could also be significant for social enterprises seeking investment 
from the social investment market as the passion and drive of a social entrepreneur has been shown 
to be crucial in successfully seeking investment (Howard, 2012). 
 
The final areas relating to what constitutes investment readiness for SMEs seeking investment has 
been in the ‘market’ characteristics of the business proposal, which relates to the market that the 
SME operates in, as well as geography and sector. Research by Mason and Harrison (2001) has 
shown that investors are discouraged by businesses that operate in highly competitive markets, as 
this can not only lead to poor growth potential, but also requires a business to be extremely well-
focused and to have a clear and innovative ‘unique selling point’. Indeed, for an SME operating in a 
highly competitive market to successfully access finance, the business plan needs to be extremely 
detailed and highly developed to avoid rejection (Mason and Harrison, 2001). Research by 
Champenois et al. (2006) also identified that venture capital investment criteria were often industry 
specific, with investors looking for organisational skills complementary to that sector. Finally, 
Deakins et al., (2008) also identified geography as having an impact upon the investment readiness 
of an SME, with SMEs based in rural areas struggling more than urban-based businesses to access 
finance. This was perceived to be due to a reliance on localised markets, which could also offer a 
barrier to social enterprises as these often operate in localised economies. 
 
Nevertheless, the investment readiness of a potential investee is not solely related to investor 
perceptions of their business, but also on the entrepreneur’s perception/knowledge of the finance 
market as well. This has been shown to occur in relation to both the accessing of debt and equity 
finance by SMEs. Myers (1984) developed the ‘pecking order’ theory, in which entrepreneurs do 
not attempt to access equity-type finance as they do not wish to give up control of their business. 
This has also been labelled ‘equity aversion’ and it has been suggested that this is due to 
‘information asymmetry’, in which the entrepreneur is not aware of or is incorrectly informed about 
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equity investments (Van Auken, 2001; Silver et al., 2010). In accessing debt finance Kon and 
Storey (2003) and Fraser (2005) discussed the ‘discouraged borrower’ effect. This is where the 
entrepreneur or SME are discouraged from applying for debt finance either due to negative prior 
experiences or a perception that they will be unsuccessful. Indeed, this self-selection process can 
lead SMEs to ‘bootstrap’ (sustain without external help) rather than seeking external investment 
(Deakins et al., 2008). Research on social enterprises seeking social finance has also shown that 
there is nervousness amongst social enterprises in seeking growth capital, as many felt that in 
accessing such investment they would be placing themselves in positions of increased financial and 
contractual risk. Indeed, Howard (2012) identifies that changing social enterprise stakeholder mind-
sets away from seeking grant-funding towards seeking repayable investment are crucial to 
developing investment readiness (Howard, 2012). 
 
Summary 
 
The prior research outlined above has provided an overview of the social investment market in the 
UK. It has shown that the social investment market consists of three elements; supply-side social 
investors, demand-side investees and intermediary organisations (SIFIs) that link the first two 
elements together (Nicholls, 2010a). Academic research into the perception of investment readiness 
amongst SIFIs is urgently required, as whilst there is a significant body of academic research that 
explores the investment readiness of SMEs (both from a supply-side and demand-side point of 
view), there is little research that explores investment readiness criteria in the social investment 
market. Indeed, the limited non-academic research that does exist in this area suggests that charities 
and social enterprises are often unprepared for investment and struggle to make the transition to 
scalable, commercial ventures (Howard, 2012). Studies into investment readiness can increase 
collaboration between entrepreneurs and investors and hence create more investment opportunities 
(Kollmann and Kuckertz, 2010). It is therefore imperative that studies into investment readiness in 
the social investment market are undertaken. The research reported in this paper sought to address 
this by exploring the perceptions of investment readiness amongst UK SIFI fund managers. 
 
Research Aims 
 
The review of the prior research outlined above has identified that academic research into social 
finance and the social investment market in the UK is limited. This is particularly true in relation to 
understanding the criteria used by SIFIs in assessing social enterprise investment applications. The 
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aim of the research was therefore to explore what SIFI fund managers perceived investment 
readiness to be, as well as to explore the impact that these conceptions of investment readiness 
would have on the future of the social investment market in the UK. The research reported in this 
paper therefore sought to explore these two specific research aims outlined below, which were 
derived from the literature outlined above. 
 
Research Aim 1: What constitutes SIFI conceptions of investment readiness and how does 
this relate to theories of investment readiness from the mainstream finance sector? 
 
Research Aim 2: What implications do the investment readiness criteria articulated by SIFIs 
have for the future development of the social investment market? 
 
Methodology 
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
An analysis of secondary data was conducted (websites, policy reports and promotional materials) 
in order to identify SIFI organisations operating in the UK social investment market at a 
national/multi-regional level. This phase of the research identified 22 SIFIs, of which 15 agreed to 
participate in the research study (see Table 1 below for a breakdown of the sample). The study 
adopted a qualitative research method, in which semi-structured interviews were conducted with the 
fund manager (or other relevant personnel) at the 15 SIFIs. These interviews sought to elicit 
information about the SIFI organisations; participant perspectives of the investment decision-
making process; the criteria utilised when carrying out due-diligence; and perceptions around what 
constituted investment readiness. Participant perspectives on the social finance market and the 
future of social investment were also sought. The semi-structured nature of the interviews also 
allowed the participants to discuss any other issues that they felt were important. 
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Table 1 – Organisational Type & Interview Participant Role 
Organisation CEO Fund Manager 
Senior Fund 
Employee 
Total 
     
Ethical Bank/Fund (Mainly 
Debt Finance) 
0 6 2 8 
     
Social Venture Capital 
Fund (Equity Type 
Finance) 
0 2 0 2 
     
Social Venture 
Philanthropy Fund 
0 1 1 2 
     
Brokerage/Social 
Enterprise Development 
Fund 
1 2 0 3 
     
Total 1 11 3 15 
 
Data and Analysis 
 
The 15 interviews ranged from 33 minutes in length to 83 minutes in length, with an average 
interview length of 56 minutes. Out of the fifteen interviews, seven were held in person at the 
relevant SIFI and eight were held over the telephone and all interview data was recorded and 
transcribed for analysis. The method employed to analyse the participant’s individual semi-
structured interviews collected in the research was ‘Constant Comparative Method’ (CCM) (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). CCM is an iterative procedure designed for the qualitative 
analysis of text and is based on ‘Grounded Theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). CCM has been 
successfully applied in previous studies across a wide range of disciplines including social venture 
creation (Haugh, 2007). This method of analysis focuses on a process where categories emerge 
from the data via inductive reasoning rather than coding the data according to predetermined 
categories (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). CCM involves five main stages; Immersion, ‘units of 
analysis’ are identified; Categorisation, ‘categories’ emerge from the ‘units of analysis’; 
Phenomenological reduction, ‘themes’ emerge from the ‘categories’ and are interpreted by the 
researchers; Triangulation, support for researcher interpretations of ‘themes’ is sought in additional 
data; Interpretation, overall interpretation of findings is conducted in relation to prior research 
and/or theoretical models (McLeod, 1994).  
 
Results 
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Analysis of the interviews identified 118 discernibly different units of analyses (e.g. ‘Financial 
Sustainability’ and ‘Fund Size’). During ‘categorisation’ these ‘units of analysis’ were grouped into 
24 ‘categories’ and from these categories 6 ‘themes’ emerged through a process of 
‘phenomenological reduction’. These six emergent ‘themes’ were subsequently interpreted as ‘The 
Social Investment and Finance Intermediaries’, ‘The Social Investment Market’, ‘Financial 
Investment Criteria’, ‘Non-Financial Investment Criteria’, ‘Decision-making Process’ and 
‘Developing Investment Readiness’ (see Figure 1 for a diagrammatic illustration of this process). 
These themes were interpreted as organisational perceptions based upon the opinions articulated by 
the participants at each SIFI. It is proposed that an examination of these themes will reveal the 
factors that influence investment decisions within the social finance market, as well as the 
‘investment-ready’ characteristics sought by SIFIs in investees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Phases of CCM Analysis for the SIFI Interview Data: 
 
      Immersion        Categorisation                 Phenomenological  
Reduction 
      UoA (118)           Categories (24)                          Themes (6) 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: The SIFIs 
 
1, 9, 12, 13, 17. 
B: The Social Finance 
Market 
 
4, 14, 18, 19. 
C: Financial 
Investment Criteria 
 
6, 7, 15. 
D: Non-Financial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 Discernibly 
different ‘Units 
of Analyses’ 
1: The Ethical 
Investment Funds 
 
44, 1, 3, 2. 
2: Social Enterprise 
Partners 
 
20, 21, 111, 79. 
3: Social Enterprise 
Legal Structure 
28, 25, 26, 90, 24, 
71. 
4: Social Enterprise 
Misconceptions 
 
37, 38, 39. 
5: Governance 
 
12,13, 70, 15. 
6: Social Enterprise 
Finances 
 
5, 10, 22, 16, 97. 
7: Social Enterprise 
Trading Maturity 
 
6, 7. 
8: Skillsets 
 
89, 14, 82, 103, 57. 
9: SIFI Investments 
4, 49, 65, 42, 60, 43, 
59, 118, 19, 64, 77. 
10: Initial Personal 
Relations 
 
68, 46, 56, 53, 63. 
11: Social Impact 
 
9, 11, 85, 112, 104, 
99, 27, 69, 110. 
12: SIFI Averages 
 
31, 33, 35, 36, 32, 
34, 91. 
13: SI Evaluation 
 
14: The Social 
Finance Market 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NB. The numbers displayed above in Figure 1 in the ‘categories’ boxes correspond to the relevant Units of Analyses 
contained in that category. The numbers in the ‘themes’ boxes correspond to the relevant category contained in that 
theme. 
 
Research Findings 
 
Theme A: The Social Investment and Finance Intermediaries (SIFIs) 
 
The participants provided overviews of their SIFI related to fund history, legal structure and 
income-streams. The majority raised capital through consumer-based investor deposits (ethical 
banks), private-sector investor deposits (social venture capital funds), endowment funds and 
donations (social venture philanthropy organisations), as well as government investment. The legal 
structure of the funds was also varied with ethical banks operating as charities, public limited 
companies, and Industrial Provident Societies; the social venture capital funds being run as 
Companies Limited by Guarantee or Share; whilst the social venture philanthropy/social enterprise 
development organisations functioned as charities or ‘Companies Limited by Share’. 
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“I mean structure wise we are a Company Limited by Shares. It is wholly owned…by the 
[parent company]……the [parent company] I believe is a Company Limited by Guarantee, 
and that effectively up-streams it’s profits into the [SIFI] Foundation, which is obviously a 
charity.” (P1) 
 
“The [Fund] is obviously a different investor base, so our investors include the 
government…some charitable foundations…a number of banks…and a number of ‘high net-
worths’.” (P4) 
 
The participants also discussed the different types of investments that they made, which could be 
split into debt, equity and quasi-equity finance. The participants also discussed the high transaction 
costs of investing in social enterprises, mainly due to the need to try and reduce failure rates through 
rigorous due-diligence. 
 
“…the £5 million or so of commitments out of the finance fund is all investment, and that's 
in the form of loans, quasi equity, [shares]…” (P2) 
 
“Well we reckon as a rough figure for every pound we get, 65 pence gets invested, you know 
we lose under 10%. It costs us about 15% to do the deal, and the rest is sort of social costs, 
and management costs.” P11) 
 
Theme B – The Social Finance Market 
 
The participants viewed the social finance market as unusual in its demands and needs due to the 
dual-mission of social enterprises. Sustainability was seen as a key problem due to the often low-
turnovers and profit margins of social enterprises, the high transaction costs of individual deals and 
the small-size of SIFIs (relative to the commercial sector). The participants also discussed a 
perceived demand/supply mismatch in the sector, with finance deals and sizes that were often 
unsuitable for small social enterprises. The cause of this was seen to be misunderstanding between 
the supply and demand sides of the social investment market. 
 
“…the money is skewed; there is lots [of finance] at big levels for low-risk proposals…so 
you’ve got a mass of high-risk, small-scale organisations looking for investment. And it 
doesn’t cross, so it’s a dysfunctional market…” (P11) 
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“So I think another problem too would be that some people in this social investment market 
[social enterprises], they almost think that because they’ve got such a good sort of ethic or 
impact, they don’t have to do the numbers. You know this is great, just support me, I’m 
doing good……well no it’s not like that. It isn’t a charitable donation; this is an investment 
or a loan.” (P6) 
 
Some of the SIFIs also provided funding to other SIFIs in the sector. Additionally, there was also 
inter-fund cooperation both in assisting with due-diligence procedures and in providing match-
funding investments into social enterprises (usually slightly higher-risk social enterprises). 
 
“So anyway, we invested in these funds to try and do it almost better than us because then 
our money's pulled in a bigger pool of money…So we tried that approach to say, "Okay, are 
there growth social enterprises there? Can these guys support it better?" (P2)  
 
The final area that the participants discussed was the impact that government funding had produced 
on the social investment market, through initiatives such as the ‘Social Enterprise Investment Fund’ 
or the development and promotion of ‘Social Impact Bonds’. ‘Social Impact Bonds’ were also seen 
as being potentially high transaction-cost investments. 
 
“I think the big thing for us is that the cost of running these sorts of fund-raising exercises 
[Social Impact Bonds etc.]  and the management, is quite horrendous, they’ve set so many 
sort of regulations…the sort of minimum fee of getting them going is usually quite high.” 
(P6) 
 
Theme C: Financial Investment Criteria 
 
Unsurprisingly, the participants talked about the fundamental need for the social enterprise seeking 
investment to be financially sustainable and to be able to service the investment provided to them at 
a reasonable rate of return. There was a desire to see social enterprises utilising multiple income 
streams that would not make them vulnerable to contract cancellations. The income origin (public, 
private or third sector) was not deemed important, as long as it was secure over the medium-term. 
In assessing the ‘sustainability’ of a social enterprise’s finances, grant-funding was not considered 
as a viable source of income by most of the participants, although match-funding was a positive 
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aspect that would boost ‘investment-confidence’. Overall, there was acknowledgement that the 
financial investment criteria utilised in the social investment market was no different than that used 
by mainstream private-sector investors. 
 
“So obviously a social start, then it’s then looking at obviously the financials…if it’s debt 
financing, can they service it, if it’s equity or equity like mezzanine finance, is it going to 
potentially give us a reasonable return…what’s the growth potential?” (P1)  
 
“I don't think it's about income, it's about having sustainability of income sources…you 
want to look at who are your competitors? Have you maintained that level of income? 
What's the market growth in that particular area?” (P9) 
 
“…a number of the ones we see are other matched-funding, yes, we like to see that.” (P3) 
 
The trading maturity of the social enterprise investee was also seen as very important, as all but one 
of the funds were not interested in investing in start-up social enterprises. Indeed, whilst the 
profitability of the trading income was not crucial, SIFIs were looking for social enterprises with 
two to three years of trading history. 
 
“…we are not looking for early start-ups, we're looking for organisations that have a 
proven model, so they may have piloted it and they may be existing, they're probably cash 
negative at the moment…but not start-up...” (P9) 
 
The final area that the participants discussed in relation to financial assessments of the potential 
social enterprise investee was in the area of business plan scrutiny. This would usually take place at 
the ‘second phase’ of an application, when the cash-flow projections of the business proposal would 
be tested. This was sometimes done by external consultancy partners but was usually completed in-
house. The market and potential competitors were also factored into this analysis and the due-
diligence process often led to conditions being placed on any loan offer (i.e. the appointment of a 
new finance director). 
 
“I mean we would take care, an awful lot of due-diligence really. I mean as you would 
probably imagine. We are looking through the business plan; we are making sure that the 
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social entrepreneur actually understands the figures so he hasn’t just delegated it through 
his account or his finance guy.” (P6) 
 
“If it’s a good business and we see that it can work but it needs a bit more financial control 
we have to put conditions on where they need to have either financial training or they need 
to bring in someone with the skills.” (P4) 
 
Theme D: Non-Financial Investment Criteria 
 
The participants also discussed a large number of non-financial criteria that they used to assess 
potential social enterprise investees. The personal relationship between the fund employee dealing 
with the application and the social entrepreneur was seen as of paramount importance. 
 
“So you know a mutually respectful and a mutually useful relationship, so the advice or 
support you try to provide won’t just fall on deaf ears. So that sort of two-way mutual 
respect I think is useful as well as an ability to deliver…as well as decency.” (P10) 
 
Interestingly and despite the government’s creation of the ‘Community Interest Company’ (CIC) 
legal form, the legal structure of a potential social enterprise investee was not viewed as important. 
The participants did not always even require the potential investees to have asset-locks in place. 
 
“…we wouldn't exclude anybody for a particular legal status but sometimes a legal status 
determines what the investment will be. So if it's a charity, obviously we can't take 
shares……So I think it's about, you know, control of mission, control of purpose that we're 
interested in.” (P2) 
 
However, governance was seen as crucial in a social enterprise securing investment. The 
participants talked about the need for social enterprise investees to have an effective board that is 
structured properly and operates as a commercial enterprise would. Within this board, there was a 
desire to see directors who had diverse and complimentary skill-sets, such as financial, marketing 
and legal acumen. 
 
“We do, we do place importance on people, I think that’s quite important to remember, that 
people make in organisation. The skill-set, well passion is always a good one; they’ve got to 
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be passionate in what they do. But we also look at the board, that’s quite crucial for us, we 
start looking at the board and the skill set that they have. So we really would like to see 
someone with financial background or financial-nous really, somebody with legal, you know 
the usual governance, the usual good governance model.” (P8) 
 
The other major non-financial consideration was a focus upon the social mission and the social 
impact that the social enterprise sought to make. By far the most important criterion was the need 
for the investee to be delivering a front-line social mission. The need for the social impact to be 
scalable along with the financial aspects of the business was also important. In relation to this there 
was also an acknowledgement of the double-bottom line and the pressure that delivering and 
measuring social impact had upon financial sustainability, which made the participant funds very 
open to different methods of measuring social impact.  
 
“…when I’m assessing an application, you’ve got all the normal financials, directors. What 
business plans are all about? But I actually have to fill in a section, what the social benefits 
will be…So it 100% has to have the social angle.” (P3) 
 
“The only thing that is unique to a social enterprise is that they're trying to balance 
financial and social objectives, and then we try to help them with, you know, figuring out 
how to balance that and also how to measure their social impact, you know, what are the 
best metrics to use?” (P12) 
 
Finally, the majority of funds did not favour any specific sectors (i.e. health and social care) for 
investment, although a number of funds did exclude organisations with environmental missions. 
Additionally, partnerships between social enterprises and other institutions (i.e. universities), whilst 
viewed as beneficial, was very much secondary to the financial sustainability and social impact. 
 
“Ultimately in the decision, no, because you know the fact that the [university name] has 
invested in a proposition and we’re looking at it, the proposition still has the ability to go 
belly up. [University name] may have made a poor decision, so the underwriting strength of 
the proposition has to stand or fall on its own two feet.” (P14) 
 
Theme E: Decision-Making Process 
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The participants also discussed the decision-making processes and structures that were in place at 
their funds. One of the most common processes in place was the assessment of initial applications, 
followed by an assessment (financial and social) of the business plan. Social enterprises that were 
deemed to be potential investees at this stage were then supported to develop their business plan 
further alongside an ‘investment officer’, before the full finance application was sent to the fund’s 
investment panel where the final decision was made. Interestingly many of the participants stated 
that the small-size of their funds often meant that there were limited resources (mainly staff) with 
which to carry out the due-diligence of applications and assist social enterprises to improve their 
business plans. This was seen as holding back social investment due to the high transaction costs 
involved. 
 
“So and once it's gone through that stage [due-diligence], we then bring it to an internal 
yes/no meeting of our finance director, chief exec and myself and there's an administrator 
there, and then if it gets through that meeting, it goes up to our investment panel, which we 
just call our finance fund panel……And that's where we will, that's the panel that can agree 
on investments.” (P2) 
 
“Another problem would be resources you know, [SIFI name] gets hundreds of enquiries 
from people who want help, and you know a vast majority of them fall outside what we are 
reasonably able to deal with because of the amount, or time involved, or the level of 
development that it’s at, or the number of staff that we have got.” (P6) 
 
The majority of the participants provided active support to potential investees, helping them to 
improve their business plans, as well as in agreeing measures of social impact. The recruitment of 
senior management staff and the placement of non-executive board directors from the fund occurred 
(understandably) much more prevalently with equity investments. This meant that the majority of 
participant funds engaged with ‘active investment’, with only one fund acting as an inactive 
investor.  
 
“Yes, these are [on a] one-to-one basis [prior to and post-investment], absolutely one-to-one 
basis. It’s a very, very, expensive model that is absolutely crucial in the sector…” (P8) 
 
“When we think that that’s really business critical, yes [will offer support in developing the 
management team]…And quite often our legal [team] will say that they need our permission 
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to recruit anyone…so to make sure that anyone coming into a top management level 
position is someone that we are happy with.” (P5) 
 
Theme F: Developing Investment Readiness 
 
The participants articulated a number of characteristics that they would view as making a social 
enterprise more investment ready, over and above the traditional aspects that have been articulated 
in the themes above. First, organisational tenacity and resilience were seen as crucial, along with 
adaptability to changing market conditions and income streams. Second, a social entrepreneur with 
an articulate vision and a plan of how to implement this (and the experience of doing so) were seen 
as very important traits. Finally, the participants also talked about the need for the social 
entrepreneur and board members to genuinely want to undergo the organisational change towards 
becoming more ‘investment ready’. 
 
“I mean, we got one borrower who really got into trouble that fought desperately…I think 
the last 5 years of trying to get this thing off the ground and build it up…they're not going to 
lose what they thought was their future.” (P13) 
 
“So investment-readiness is about making an organisation resilient……an organisation 
should take those initiatives themselves, because it’s a learning element for them to develop. 
If you do it for them, it is just pointless.” (P8) 
 
In addition to the organisational structures outlined above, the participants also discussed the social 
entrepreneur/senior-management skillsets that they felt were important. The participants discussed 
the need for the social entrepreneur to have ambition, but that this should also be matched by a 
detailed understanding of the business plan and a propensity towards teamwork. The participants 
also stated a desire for practical skills and experience over accredited formal qualifications. Finally, 
the participants felt that there was a current lack of business and financial skills amongst many 
social entrepreneurs that needed to be addressed in the future. 
 
“Well, we look for entrepreneurs who have vision and ambition and so they've got to be, 
they've got to have a really clear vision for what they're trying to achieve and they've got to 
be very articulate in getting that point across……they've got to know the sector that they're 
working in, they've got to have, you know, understand the market.” (P9) 
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“So in terms of accreditation, I’m kind of totally agnostic, I don’t mind what someone’s 
formal background is, but very much mind if that then translates into an organisation that 
has a really robust credible business plan.” (P5) 
 
“We'd look for somebody who's got the, an ability to build a team……have they the ability 
to form a team around them to do it?” (P2) 
 
The final area that the participants discussed related to the difficulties that they experienced in 
working with social enterprises and the need to bridge the perception/understanding gap between 
the social investment and social enterprise sectors. One of the main problems identified with 
working with social enterprises was their risk-averse nature and the intensive support that was 
required to get a social enterprise to the investment stage. There was also an acknowledgement that 
many investors did not understand the social enterprise sector and that this made it difficult to 
sometimes leverage-in external investment and also led to the promotion of unsuitable investment 
vehicles in the social investment market.  
 
“I think the main barrier is that a lot of voluntary social enterprises organisations don’t 
want loans they want grants they’re always saying that they need finance but by finance they 
mean a very long equity that they don’t have to worry about...” (P4) 
 
“I think there’s now too many investment bankers who’ve gone from [established financial 
firms],  just move into the sector and trying to bring new financial vehicles as they call it, 
into the sector…..I don’t believe that there’s a market for these yet.” (P8) 
 
“Growing an intermediary sector. Because unless A can find B, the investment doesn't take 
place…you know, a health related social enterprise, it doesn't know about how to secure 
investment. So if there isn't investment in the intermediary infrastructure, [the market] won't 
happen.” (P12) 
 
Discussion 
 
Research Aim 1: What constitutes SIFI conceptions of investment readiness and how does this 
relate to theories of investment readiness from the mainstream finance sector? 
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The analysis of the data outlined above provides evidence of the normative absorption of the social 
investment market by the mainstream investment markets with the needs of the investor taking 
primacy over those of the investee, driven by a ‘means-end rationality’ (Nicholls, 2010a). In 
relation to the financial elements of investment readiness, the most important financial aspect of 
being investment ready related to the sustainability of a social enterprise’s financial income and 
their subsequent ability to service the investment at a reasonable rate of return (Mason and 
Harrison, 1999; Mason and Stark, 2004; McWade, 2012). The SIFIs preferred to see multiple 
income streams that would not leave a social enterprise vulnerable to contract/order cancellations, 
although perhaps surprisingly the SIFIs were not concerned as to whether this income originated in 
the private or public sectors. Grant-funding was not considered by SIFIs in their financial 
calculations, although match-funding from institutional partners or other investors was viewed 
positively.  
 
The SIFI organisations were also not interested in funding start-up or very early-stage social 
enterprises, instead preferring organisations with at least two years of trading history. This may be 
related to the information asymmetry within the social investment market (Evenett and Richter, 
2011), which leads investors to seek investment opportunities where there is more information with 
which to make a decision. This suggests that the SIFIs within the social investment market are ‘risk-
averse’ and seek investment opportunities only where there is detailed information (Deakins et al., 
2008). The final financial aspect of investment readiness that was articulated by the participating 
SIFIs related to scrutiny of the business plan, which offers support to prior research that highlighted 
the importance of a business plan to securing investment (McWade, 2012). It also provides 
evidence for the normative institutionalisation of the social investment market with mainstream 
investment criteria, in which the quality of information held in the business plan, the evidence of the 
capitalisation of the business and the analysis of risk over return are all covered in detail (Mason 
and Harrison, 1999; Paul et al., 2003; Mason and Kwok, 2010). 
 
The importance of non-financial criteria to a social enterprise’s investment readiness was also 
evidenced through the data gathered from the SIFI interviews. As with mainstream investment, 
governance issues were crucial in the assessment of the investment readiness of a social enterprise. 
The main area of governance that the SIFIs discussed related to the skills and structure of the 
management team. The SIFIs sought investees with boards and management teams that contained 
individuals with track records in the market/sector and diverse and complimentary skill-sets. This 
23 
 
offers support to prior research that highlighted the importance of competent management teams to 
social investors (McWade, 2012) and also highlights the normative nature of investment readiness 
in the social investment market (Muzyka et al., 1996; Vasilescu; 2009). Interestingly, the SIFI 
participants did not view the legal structure of a social enterprise as being important in the 
investment decision-making process or in relation to investment readiness. Indeed, asset-locks were 
not even required by the majority of the SIFIs and this suggests that government legislation, such as 
the creation of the CIC legal form (Nicholls, 2010b), have been unimportant in shaping the social 
investment market in the UK.  
 
The importance of the personal relationship between the SIFI and the investee was also articulated 
by the participants. This was shaped by the perceived personal characteristics of the social 
entrepreneur, with an ability to take on-board advice, integrity and decency all advocated as 
positives by the participants. This also highlights the normative nature of the social investment 
market as such personal characteristics are also important in mainstream investment perceptions of 
investment readiness (Mason and Harrison, 2001; Wilson et al., 2007). This finding also offers 
support to prior research that suggested that information asymmetry was prevalent in the social 
investment market (Evenett and Richter, 2011), as subjective ‘gut-feeling’ evaluations of 
entrepreneurs traits are symptomatic of markets that lack clear information or metrics (Jankowicz 
and Hisrich, 1987; Ramón et al., 2007; Ferrary, 2010).  
 
The final non-financial assessment of investment readiness in the social investment market related 
to the evaluation of the social enterprise’s social mission and impact. A frontline social mission was 
seen as key for a social enterprise in being able to access finance from a SIFI, although this was 
complimentary to, rather than more important than, financial evaluations (McWade, 2012). 
Interestingly, there were no standard measures of social impact utilised by the SIFIs, who instead 
assessed a social enterprise’s social mission through intuition. This is in part due to the lack of 
standardised metrics available for measuring social impact and the perceived problems of those 
measures that are available (i.e. SROI) (Maree and Mertens, 2012; Saltuk et al., 2011). However, it 
is also indicative of the ‘information asymmetry’ prevalent within the social investment market as 
the lack of credible indicators of social performance, as in any market, forces investors to make 
intuitive, subjective and individual appraisals of investment opportunities (Jankowicz and Hisrich, 
1987; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). 
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Finally, there were other informal indicators of investment readiness within the social investment 
market alluded to by the SIFI participants. Many of these related to the social entrepreneur 
themselves, with participants articulating a desire to invest in a social enterprise in which the lead 
individual had a strong vision that they could articulate clearly. Organisational resilience was also 
seen as important, with staff that could react to and cope with sudden market changes and funding 
pressures. Perhaps the most important indicator of investment readiness in this area was an 
organisations’ willingness to seek investment finance amongst its owners, management team, staff 
and stakeholders. There was a perception amongst the SIFI participants that unless the majority of 
these elements genuinely desired to seek investment instead of grant-funding, then the development 
of investment readiness capability would be impossible. This suggests that there is an element of 
‘equity-aversion’ (Van Auken, 2001; Silver et al., 2010) and ‘discouraged borrower effect’ (Kon 
and Storey, 2003; Fraser, 2005) on the demand-side of the social investment market and this offers 
support to prior research that stated that social entrepreneurs do not wish to lose control of their 
social enterprises and/or are risk-averse (Howard, 2012). However, it could also be a consequence 
of social enterprises lacking information about the social investment market, as well as of social 
investors and SIFIs offering investment products that are unsuitable for social enterprises (Evenett 
and Richter, 2011). 
 
Research Aim 2: What implications do the investment readiness criteria articulated by SIFIs have 
for the future development of the social investment market? 
 
The data analysis suggests that the social investment market in the UK remains an asymmetrical 
market in relation to the information held by investors, intermediaries and demand-side investees 
(Evenett and Richter, 2011). The SIFI participants stated that on the supply-side of the market, 
some investors lacked information about social investments both in relation to the financial and 
social impact performance of social enterprise investees. This is unsurprising as the small, nascent 
state of the market means that there is a lack of investments from which data and learning can be 
gathered. Additionally, the lack of standardised metrics for social impact and the lack of trust that 
the SIFIs had in those that did exist (i.e. SROI) (Maree and Mertens, 2012), denotes a situation in 
which information on the scalability of social impact is limited. This lack of information on market 
performance is exacerbated by the non-standard nature of the demand-side of the social investment 
market, in which investee organisations operate according to a ‘double or triple bottom line’ (social, 
environmental and economic) (Campi et al., 2006). This requires organisations in the social 
investment market, such as SIFIs, to make judgements on ‘blended return’ (Emerson, 2003) with 
25 
 
incomplete information on both elements of the return calculation (i.e. social/environmental and 
financial). This leads to what the participants articulated as the need to remain ‘sustainable’, which 
can be interpreted as a desire to minimise what Mason and Stark (2004) termed ‘Type 1’ errors 
(investing in social enterprises that fail). This offers support to prior research that identified a lack 
of ‘information flow’ within the social investment market (Nicholls, 2009; Nicholls, 2010b; Wood 
et al., 2012), which in turn leads investors (in this case SIFIs) to pursue detailed due-diligence 
processes, which increases transaction costs (Evenett and Richter, 2011). The high costs of 
individual investment deals inevitably leaves less recyclable capital and also leads investors such as 
SIFIs to ignore riskier (but perhaps more innovative) propositions (Geobey et al., 2012). However, 
some of the SIFIs were cooperating in investment propositions both in relation to due-diligence 
processes and match-funding investments. This decreases the transaction costs of individual deals, 
and promotes networks and information flow between SIFIs. Such an approach, where appropriate, 
is one that should be encouraged by policy-makers and adopted by SIFIs going forwards. The 
reduction of risk through inter-SIFI cooperation would allow for the growth of available capital, as 
well as allowing riskier investments to take place. 
 
The final area that was identified as important in assisting the UK social investment market to 
develop, relates to demand-side organisations understanding of the social investment market; what 
constitutes investment readiness within it; and the assistance that many social enterprises require in 
developing credible and robust business plans. Many of the SIFI participants (14 out of the 15) 
operated as active investors, in which they supported social enterprises (often intensively) through 
the pre and post-investment stages. This support ranged from business plan development through to 
active involvement in the recruitment of senior personnel at the social enterprise investee. Indeed, 
many of the SIFIs articulated that this support was crucial as without it the business plans and 
investment proposals of social enterprise investees would not be of a high enough standard to 
secure investment. This offers support to prior research that articulated the need for investment 
readiness programmes in developing the demand-side capabilities of an investment market (Mason 
and Harrison, 2001; Mason and Kwok, 2010). This suggests that government interventions to raise 
investment readiness in the social enterprise sector (i.e. the Investment Contract Readiness Fund) 
are important in the future growth of the UK social investment market. The data gathered in this 
research suggest that this investment readiness support is currently being provided by SIFIs, which 
inevitably drives up transaction costs for investments and leads to less recyclable capital being 
available for reinvestment (Geobey et al., 2012). The development of funds/organisations that 
independently provide investment readiness support (independent to SIFIs), or the provision of 
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funding to SIFIs specifically for the development of demand-side investment readiness, could 
provide an important tool in growing the social investment market. Indeed, such support would at 
least help to reduce the information asymmetry that currently exists between the supply and 
demand-sides of the social investment market (Evenett and Richter, 2011). 
 
Summary 
 
Whilst the research reported in this paper is qualitative in nature, it is unusual in that the results are 
generalizable as the participant sample involved 15 of the identified 22 SIFIs currently operating in 
the UK. However, further research outside of the UK would provide additional supporting evidence 
for the conclusions made in this paper. The research reported here has identified that amongst SIFIs 
the key perceived elements of investment readiness in the social investment market relate to 
financial sustainability; robust governance structures; broad and complimentary management team 
skillsets; clearly defined and scalable social missions and impacts; and a willingness and desire to 
seek investment and become investment ready. This aligns the concept of investment readiness in 
the UK social investment market with mainstream finance concepts of investment readiness, with 
the additional need to focus upon social impact. Additionally, it offers empirical support to Nicholls 
(2010a) assertion that the social investment market is undergoing a normative absorption by the 
mainstream investment markets that is driven by ‘means-end rationality’, with the needs of the 
investor taking primacy over those of the investee. This viewpoint states that the social investment 
market is being absorbed into mainstream markets through the utilisation of traditional finance tools 
and the crossover of financiers from the mainstream finance sector. This future development is also 
being hindered by the lack of robust, standard metrics of social impact and the still small-scale of 
the market, which limits the information available to SIFIs and leads to the pursuit of low-
risk/large-scale investments. The growth of the social investment market is also limited by a lack of 
knowledge about and desire to seek investment within demand-side organisations that could 
possibly be overcome through investment readiness programmes and funds.  
 
The findings presented above have important implications for the development of social investment 
markets both in the UK and in other countries where social investment markets exist (i.e. the 
Netherlands, France, Belgium and Sweden). Indeed, the concept of investment readiness identified 
in this research, along with the evaluation of the current state of the social investment market in the 
UK, provides salient lessons for the growth of nascent social investment markets. Policy-makers, 
investors and social enterprise development organisations need to support the development of 
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demand-side investment readiness, as well as capitalising the supply-side of a social investment 
market. Information-asymmetry also needs to be countered through the development of investment 
readiness programmes, as well as the expansion of networks between investors and social 
enterprises. These networks should provide information on the types of investment available and 
also detail the customer journey that social enterprises can anticipate in seeking investment. 
Additionally, cooperation between investment funds in due-diligence processes, the spreading of 
investment risk, and policy/funding interventions designed to reduce transaction costs would also 
assist the growth of investable capital. Such initiatives may allow any given social investment 
market to grow quickly into an effective means of capitalising socially innovative businesses and 
organisations. 
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